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Abstract 
 
Whereas firms traditionally have been evaluated solely on financial criteria, 
contemporary  firms  are  also  evaluated  on  various  non-financial  criteria, 
including Corporate Social Performance (CSP). Such data is useful in the 
pursuit  of  evidence  of  a  relationship  between  CSP  and  various  financial 
characteristics,  including  financial  performance.  Evidence  on  such 
relationships is valuable from many perspectives. It is valuable to managers 
who seek to improve their understanding of the ways in which CSP interacts 
with firm characteristics, it is valuable to investors who seek to improve 
their understanding of how CSP relates to financial asset characteristics, and 
ultimately  it  is  valuable  to  regulators  who  seek  to  improve  their 
understanding of the firms’ financial incentive to self-regulate on corporate 
social responsibility issues. This paper presents a cross-sectional analysis 
comparing  environmental,  social  and  corporate  governance  performance 
with financial characteristics of 237 Australian firms over the August 1997 
to July 2003 period. The analysis allows for some heterogeneity in CSP-
financial  characteristics  relationships  related  to  company  size,  trading 
history  and  industry,  which  provides  valuable  additional  information  on 
such  relationships.  Findings  indicate  that  the  financial  incentive  to  self-
regulate on environmental criteria is weak and contingent on industry. The 
financial incentive to self-regulate on social criteria is marginally stronger 
and less contingent on industry. The financial incentive to self-regulate on 
governance criteria is very strong across the board, though it is particularly 
strong  within  the  banking,  diversified  financials,  insurance  and 
telecommunications  industries.  This  is  indicated  both  by  a  significant 
positive  association  between  governance  and  financial  performance  and 
very strong significant negative association between governance and risk. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Firms have traditionally been evaluated solely on financial criteria, as firms have been 
expected to assume only economic responsibilities, besides the legal responsibilities of 
operating within the law. Increasingly contemporary firms are also typically evaluated on 
non-financial criteria, such as corporate social performance (CSP), implying that firms may 
also be expected to assume some level of corporate social responsibility (CSR), as well as 
financial criteria. The question of whether managers should be expected to, and allowed to, 
assume CSR and pursue CSP as a part of, or instead of, the traditional objective of wealth 
maximisation has been debated since the early 1900s.  An evaluation of this debate is beyond 
the scope of this paper. The objective of the present study is to evaluate the empirical case for 
the financial incentive to do so, using Australian data.  
 
The theoretical and empirical literature concerning possible links between CSP and 
financial characteristics, and particularly financial performance, is extensive. Nonetheless, 
proposed theories remain unconfirmed as empirical evidence is largely inconsistent. The 
empirical literature is plagued with problems of inconsistent and often questionable use of 
data and research methodology, which has been suggested as a possible reason for 
inconsistent findings (Ullman 1985; Roman, Hayibor and Agle 1999). One problem is that 
while recent theoretical development has provided a strong case for heterogeneity in CSP-
financial characteristics relationships, such heterogeneity is not well incorporated into 
research design. The present study provides an important contribution to the literature by 
using well-researched measures of CSP, financial characteristics consistent with 
contemporary financial asset evaluation methods, a sample including a wide spectrum of 
companies, and allowing for some heterogeneity related to company size, trading history and 
industry.  Moreover, the present study provides much needed evidence on the relationship 
between CSP and financial characteristics in Australia, as nearly all previous empirical 
research has been conducted based on U.S. data.  
 
The present study examines the evidence for a relationship between CSP, including 
environmental, social and governance performance, and financial characteristics, including 
investment style, financial performance and risk. Discussions proceed as follows. First, a brief 
review of the literature is provided in order to give a theoretical and empirical background to 
the present study. This is followed by a discussion of the CSP and financial characteristics     2 
   
measures included in the present study, and the research methodology employed. Research 
findings are then reported and their implications discussed. The conclusion summarises the 
contribution of this study.  
2.  A Brief Review of the Literature 
2.1  Theoretical Background 
 
The CSR literature presents various theories of how and why CSP may affect financial 
variables. The most interesting question in the context of a CSP-financial characteristics 
relationship is perhaps the question of how CSP may indicate ability to create value. This can 
be indicated by a CSP-financial performance relationship as well as a CSP-risk relationship.  
Firms’ financial characteristics, including financial performance, may be affected by CSP via 
benefits of CSP, costs of CSP, any effects of CSP on risk, and supply of capital from socially 
responsible investment (SRI). It is also possible that CSP is affected by firms’ financial 
characteristics. Some examples are provided here. 
 
CSP may affect revenue where customers value CSP. The idea that CSP is valued by 
customers, and therefore has potential to increase consumer and producer surplus, has been 
referred to as the “social impact hypothesis” (Preston and O' Bannon 1997). CSP may increase 
or reduce costs. It has been suggested that CSP may increase costs by increasing agency costs 
because managers pursue CSP as a means to further their own social, political or career 
agendas, at the expense of shareholders (Friedman 1962; Friedman 1970). Furthermore, it 
seems likely that, regardless of possible future returns from pursuing CSP, the cost of such 
activities may be prohibitive for some firms, especially small and risky companies with tight 
budgets and high capital costs. Preston and O’Bannon (1997) call the assumption that CSP 
production represents a net cost to the firm the “trade-off hypothesis”.  
 
Stakeholder theory provides much of the basis for arguments that high CSP may imply 
lower costs to the firm. It has been suggested that failure to meet the expectations of various 
non-shareholder constituents will ultimately result in higher costs and/or lost profit 
opportunities, and that CSP may reduce both explicit and implicit costs via lower transaction 
costs (McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis 1988; Preston and O' Bannon 1997; Ruf et al.     3 
   
2001).  Zingales’ (2000) discussion of implicit contracts implies that loss of CSP can cause 
loss of valuable organisational capital, representing significant cost to the firm.  
 
Stakeholder theory, contracting theory and a transaction-cost perspective have been 
used to justify arguments that a negative relationship between CSP and risk can be expected 
because CSP will strengthen explicit and implicit contracts between the firm and its 
stakeholders and therefore reduce the probability of stakeholder action. Higher risk of 
encountering such stakeholder action (including boycotts, strikes, litigation, ‘clean-up’, or 
other government intervention) is likely to imply higher uncertainty and variability of returns 
(Waddock and Graves 1997a; Anderson 2000). Waddock and Graves (1997b) suggest CSP 
may represent better quality management, which  implies that pursuing CSP may in some 
cases serve as a risk management strategy. This argument is seconded by Orlitzky and 
Benjamin (2001), who suggest investors and lenders may regard poor CSP as a symptom of 
poor management and will regard poor CSP as an indication of higher risk via higher 
uncertainty and cash flow variability, and by Cornell and Shapiro (1987), who argue that 
failure to meet the expectations of various non-shareholder constituents will generate market 
fears, which in turn will increase a company’s risk premium. It has however also been 
suggested that pursuing CSP may lead to higher exposure to public scrutiny hence increasing 
risk (Rowley and Berman 2000). To the extent that CSP affects perceived risk, and to the 
extent that this risk is priced in the market, CSP may affect a firm’s risk premium, which 
affects the cost of capital. Similarly, to the extent that CSP affects investors’ willingness to 
hold shares, CSP affects the supply of capital.  
 
SRI reflects CSP demand from shareholders in particular, rather than stakeholders in 
general (Freeman 1984). The growth in the SRI industry in most highly developed countries 
provides evidence that social and environmental issues are a concern to some investors (The 
Allen Consulting Group Pty. Ltd. 2000). SRI and investor activism may imply that at least 
some shareholders value other factors besides financial wealth. Investors’ willingness to hold 
shares affects firms’ cost of capital. While individual investors’ divestment from a firm may 
not notably affect the firm’s cost of capital, a major divestment by a large group of investors 
or a fund manager may have such an affect, especially for closely-held companies. 
 
While the above theories imply causal effects of CSP on financial characteristics, 
theories proposing causal effect of financial characteristics on CSP are also suggested in the     4 
   
literature. Firstly, it has been suggested that larger firms are more likely to achieve high CSP 
than smaller firms because they have more resources and will allocate more funds towards 
activities that have a positive effect on CSP (Preston and O' Bannon 1997; Waddock and 
Graves 1997a). A variation of this idea suggests CSP depends on financial performance, since 
companies that perform well may be more likely to afford to pursue CSP (Preston and 
O' Bannon 1997). The idea that CSP may be more expensive for firms with high financing cost 
implies smaller riskier firms are likely to have lower CSP than larger less risky firms. 
Theories of how financial characteristics may affect CSP imply that caution must be taken 
when interpreting results from cross-sectional CSP-financial characteristics research. 
Evidence of significant CSP-financial characteristics relationships may not only be evidence 
that CSP affects financial characteristics, but also that financial characteristics may affect 
CSP. 
 
It has been argued that the nature and strength of a CSP-financial characteristics 
relationship should depend on certain factors. Rowley and Berman (2000) provide an in-depth 
discussion identifying a comprehensive set of CSP-financial performance contingency factors 
which they sort into five main groups: firm characteristics, issue conditions, industry 
characteristics, stakeholder environment, and institutional context. This suggests that CSP-
financial characteristics relationships may differ across groups. Companies with higher 
exposures to controversial CSR issues, who supply to industries with exposures, or who 
supply goods or services which are controversial in themselves or have a perceived risk of 
harm, may find it difficult to feasibly align their operations with stakeholder values.  
 
2.2  Empirical Evidence 
 
The empirical evidence provided on possible CSP-financial characteristics relationships 
is extensive. Although literature reviews on such research has been provided, they are either 
outdated (such as Ullman 1985), flawed (Griffin and Mahon 1997, as argued by Roman, 
Hayibor and Agle 1999) or incomplete (such as Roman, Hayibor and Agle 1999).  As both 
Ullman (1985) and Roman, Hayibor and Agle (1999) point out, the empirical evidence 
remains inconclusive, which is likely a result of significant inconsistencies in research design. 
This warrants an extensive examination of empirical evidence with special attention to 
whether there is a link between use of certain types of data or research methodologies and     5 
   
certain results. Such an examination falls outside the scope of this paper, and is dealt with in a 
separate paper.
1 Findings are summarised here. 
 
An examination of 55 identified empirical studies confirms earlier reports of 
inconsistent empirical evidence, but finds no evidence that certain periods in time, CSP 
measures, financial performance measures, use of control variables, or types of methods 
produce certain results. While research on CSP-financial performance relationships are more 
commonly reported on, other financial characteristics are also covered in the literature. 
Among the 55 studies examined, 51 report on CSP-financial performance relationships, seven 
report on CSP-size relationships, 10 report on CSP-risk relationships, and three report on 
CSP-book-to-market value (or similar) relationships. 
 
Although the body of reported evidence is inconsistent, there is, overall, stronger 
evidence for a positive than for a negative CSP-financial performance relationship, as 27 
studies report a positive CSP-financial performance relationship and only four studies report a 
negative CSP-financial performance relationship. Twelve studies report no evidence of a 
relationship, and eight report inconsistent results.  
 
Although the majority of studies reporting on CSP-size relationships find a positive 
relationship, there appears to be no strong evidence that size and CSP are consistently 
positively or negatively related. There is however reasonably strong evidence for a negative 
CSP-risk relationship. The consistent reports of a negative CSP-risk relationship, together 
with some reports of a positive relationship between CSP and research and development 
investment intensity and negative relationships between CSP and book-to-market equity, 
suggests that the use of unadjusted financial performance measures, which are frequent in the 
literature, are inappropriate and likely to yield unreliable results. Appropriate performance 
measurement should adjust for book-to-market value as well as size and risk. The need to 
develop methods that allow for CSP-financial characteristics contingency factors is strongly 
indicated in the literature, as very few studies allow for any heterogeneity.  
 
There is a strong theoretical basis, supported by a small amount of available empirical 
evidence, for an industry-contingent CSP-financial characteristics relationship, implying that 
such relationships vary across industries, but form more consistent patterns within industries 
(Spencer and Taylor 1987; Herremans, Akathaporn and McInnes 1993). Studies allowing for     6 
   
across industry heterogeneity in the CSP-financial characteristics relationship, such as 
Spencer and Taylor (1987) and to a certain extent Herremans, Akathaporn and McInnes 
(1993), present an important improvement in research methods. Such research may improve 
the consistency of findings and provide much needed information on how CSP and financial 
characteristics are interrelated, and in what circumstances a CSP-financial characteristics 
relationship may be expected to be positive, negative or neutral. 
 
3.  The Data 
3.1  The CSP Measures 
 
The present study uses CSP data provided by Corporate Monitor Pty. Ltd., who provide 
ratings on the environmental, social and governance performance of Australian companies. A 
detailed examination of the Corporate Monitor CSP ratings, together with alternative ratings 
from Reputation Management Pty. Ltd., is provided in a separate paper.
2 CSP ratings from 
Corporate Monitor have been published monthly in the Ethical Investor magazine since June 
2001, covering the largest 200 companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, by market 
capitalisation, as well as a smaller subset of companies. Ratings are produced on a scale from 
one (low performance) to five (high performance). The present study uses average monthly 
CSP ratings, collected between 1 August 2000 and 1 July 2003, for 237 companies. The use 
of average ratings is appropriate because ratings are very stable over time, suggesting that 
CSP is a short-term stable characteristics type variable rather than a volatile tracking-device. 
CSP ratings are calculated based on cumulative public information available from 1 July 1999 
until the time the ratings are calculated.  
 
The Corporate Monitor CSP data set is sound for many reasons. Firstly, the relatively 
large number of companies of different size means that research will be less prone to the bias 
towards very large firms that is evident in the empirical literature. Secondly, ratings are 
provided for a reasonable period of time, though time-series analysis is not possible due to the 
lack of variability in the data. Thirdly, Corporate Monitor provide ratings on three categories 
comparable to other types of CSP data used in the literature which allows investigation of 
separate CSP-financial characteristics relationships.
3 Fourthly, information included is not 
biased by managers’ own perceptions of their efforts and performance in pursuing CSP.     7 
   
Lastly, the statistical properties of the data indicate ratings are normally distributed across the 
companies in the included sample, which implies parametric analysis will yield reliable 
results. 
 
3.2  The Financial Characteristics Measures 
 
The financial characteristics measures used in the present study are selected based on a 
perspective of firms as financial assets. Eight different financial characteristics measures are 
included, which fall into three categories of style characteristics, measures of financial risk 
and measures of financial performance.  Style characteristics include size (total market 
capitalisation) and value (book-to-market value). Measures of financial performance include 
unadjusted market performance (total shareholder return), performance adjusted by total risk 
(Sharpe Ratio), performance adjusted by factor covariation (three-factor Jensen alpha) and 
performance adjusted by characteristics-matched benchmark performance. Measures of 
financial risk include total risk (standard deviation of monthly returns) and systematic market 
risk (single-factor market beta). Measures of financial characteristics are calculated over the 
period from 1 August 1997 to 1 July 2003, both covering the entire six-year period and the 
two three-year periods from 1 August 1997 to 1 July 2000 and 1 August 2000 to 1 July 2003.
4 
 
With respect to the financial characteristics date, the following should be noted. Firstly, 
outlier observations of the market return of four companies causes problems with positively 
skewed distributions. This is corrected for by omitting four companies from the second part of 
the analysis, where parametric techniques are employed. Secondly, 159 of the 237 sampled 
companies are listed during the sample period, which means they do not have complete data. 
Finally, the sample shows tendencies of a reversal in market return between the two three-
year periods over which financial performance is tracked, as companies who perform well in 
one period perform poorly in the other, and vice versa.  
 
4.  Methodology 
4.1  Testing for CSP-Financial Characteristics relationships 
 
The analysis of CSP-financial characteristics relationships comprises two parts. In the 
first part, the evidence for general bi-variate relationships between CSP and financial     8 
   
characteristics are investigated. This part of the analysis uses ordinal or ranked data, 
calculating Spearman Rank correlations between CSP and financial characteristics.
5 Since the 
literature suggest CSP-financial characteristics relationships are likely to differ across 
different types of firms Spearman Rank correlations are calculated within twelve different 
samples, including (1) the full sample of 237 companies, (2) the 100 largest companies in the 
sample (by average full-period market capitalisation), (3) the 137 smaller companies in the 
sample, (4) the 156 companies with full period trading data (listed prior to 1 August 1997), 
(5) the 81 companies with limited coverage (listed after 1 August 1997) and (6) each of seven 
industry groups. The construction of these industry groups is discussed in turn. This approach 
allows heterogeneity in CSP-financial characteristics relationships across industry groups and 
firms of different size and trading history.  
 
The second part of the analysis compares the financial characteristics of portfolios of 
companies with different CSP. Such an approach allows for non-linear CSP-financial 
characteristics relationships, consistent with reported inverted U-shaped relationships where 
firms with moderate CSP outperform firms with high and low CSP (Bowman and Haire 1975; 
Sturdivant and Ginter 1977). Portfolios are constructed by sorting the sample into groups of 
high, moderate and low CSP. This procedure is repeated for environmental, social and 
governance performance. The average financial characteristics values of each portfolio are 
compared and portfolio differences tested for statistical significance.  
4.2  Allowing For Heterogeneity in CSP-Financial Characteristics Relationships 
 
In spite of a strong theoretical basis for industry-contingent CSP-financial 
characteristics relationships, the empirical literature presents few attempts to incorporate this 
into research methodologies with the exception of Herremans, Akathaporn and McInnes 
(1993) and Spencer and Taylor (1987). The methodology applied by Herremans, Akathaporn 
and McInnes (1993) has some weaknesses when compared Spencer and Taylor (1987). The 
latter approach is therefore taken here.
6 
 
Spencer and Taylor (1987) sort companies into industry groups, and then apply a 
‘within-and-between analysis’. The within-industry analysis tests for a CSP-financial 
characteristics relationship within each industry, and the between-industry analysis test for 
such relationships between industries using industry averages. A similar within-industry     9 
   
analysis is replicated here though a between-industry analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
A within-industry analysis requires a reasonable number of constituents within each 
industry, and if possible relatively similar numbers of constituents across industries. 
Australian companies are categorised using the GICS system, which sorts companies into 23 
industry groups (hereafter referred to as industries). Due to the uneven distribution of 
companies across industries, and the small average constituency of each industry, industries 
are sorted into a smaller set of larger industry groups on the basis of suggested CSP-financial 
characteristics contingency factors, based on the framework of Rowley and Berman (2000) 
and related aspects from consumer behaviour is used for this purpose.  The classification is 
based on the following factors:  
(a)  Presence of important CSR issues 
(b)  Type of consumers (industrial or household sector) 
(c)  Extent of choice and consumers’ ability to intervene directly (via demand) or indirectly 
(via organised stakeholder and political action) 
(d)  Consumer purchase process (frequency and level of involvement; rational or emotional 
decision-making) 
(e)  Perceived risk of harm, type of risk-factors (financial, functional, physical, social, 
psychological) and reliance on reputation (high or low credence) 
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of how the seven industry groups are constructed.   
 
4.3  Constructing CSP-Sorted Portfolios for Alpha and Beta Estimation 
 
In the second part of the analysis, where the financial characteristics of high, moderate 
and low CSP portfolios are compared, Jensen alphas and market betas are estimated based on 
the portfolio returns constructed with equal weighting. Additional steps are however required 
for the first part of the analysis, where firms’ CSP and financial characteristics are compared 
on an individual basis. In this case it is necessary to construct many small portfolios, each of 
which having reasonable homogeneity in terms of CSP. This is addressed by sorting the 
sample into twenty-seven portfolios as follows. First, the sample was sorted into three 
approximately equally sized groups according to environmental performance. Second, each of     10 
   
these three groups was again sorted into three groups according to social performance. Third, 
each of the nine groups was again sorted into three groups according to governance 
performance producing  twenty-seven portfolios of companies with similar CSP ratings. 
5.  Results 
5.1  Spearman Rank Correlations  
 
Spearman Rank correlations between CSP and financial characteristics are provided in 
Table 1. Correlations between CSP and size, book-to-market value, financial performance 
measures and risk are reported here in turn. Correlations between environmental performance 
and size and between social performance and size follow a similar pattern as significant 
positive correlations are found among large companies whereas significant negative 
correlations are found among small companies, and as correlations are inconsistent between 
industry groups. Strong positive correlations between social performance and size are also 
found within the sample of companies with full-period coverage. In the governance 
performance category, correlations are significantly positive within the full sample, 
significant negative correlations among recently listed companies, and not notably different 
across industry groups.  Significant correlations between CSP and book-to-market value are 
scarce, though to the extent that they do appear they are largely negative.  
 
Significant correlations between environmental performance and financial performance 
are sparse and are only found within some industry groups. Significant positive correlations 
between environmental performance and total shareholder return are observed in the energy-
related and necessity services groups, and some significant negative correlations are found in 
the situational (lifestyle) consumption group. Correlations between social performance and 
financial performance are more prevalent. Some significant positive such correlations are 
found within the full sample, and strong and significant positive correlations are found in the 
necessity services group. Correlations between governance and financial performance are 
more prevalent again. A significant reversal between the two three-year periods is observed, 
where significant positive correlations are found in the 2000-2003 period and significant 
negative correlations are found in the 1997-2000 period.  Correlations are consistently strong, 
significant and positive among recently-listed companies and the necessity services industry 
group. Jensen alphas, which are only calculated within the full sample, are significantly and     11 
   
positively correlated with both social and governance performance, though only for the 2000-
2003 period. 
 
Significant correlations between CSP and risk are prevalent and are always negative. 
Significant negative correlations between risk governance performance are most prevalent, 
followed by social performance and then by environmental performance. Thought there are 
some minor differences between the various samples, correlations are not very different 
across these.  Significant negative correlations between risk and social performance, and 
particularly governance performance, are particularly strong in the necessity services group. 
Correlations between governance performance and market beta, based on the full sample, are 
consistently significant, negative and strong.  Correlations between social performance and 
market beta significant only for the 1997-2000 period. 
 
5.2  Comparing High, Moderate and Low CSP Portfolios 
 
Comparisons between portfolios of high, moderate and low CSP companies are 
provided in Table 2. Results suggest that companies with high social and governance 
performance are larger than companies with moderate and low performance. In both cases, 
high CSP portfolios exhibit significantly larger average company size compared to moderate 
CSP portfolios, whereas differences between moderate and low CSP portfolios are not 
significant. High, moderate and low environmental performance portfolios are not statistically 
different by company size. No consistent differences are found between portfolios’ average 
book-to-market values, although high and moderate governance performance companies have 
significantly lower book-to-market values compared to low governance performance 
companies over the 2000-2003 period. There are no consistent significant differences between 
the financial performance of high, moderate and low environmental performance portfolios. 
There is however some evidence of a significant positive association between governance 
performance and financial performance, which is strong when measured by the Sharpe Ratio, 
followed by total shareholder return. Strong reversals are observed in the Jensen alphas 
between the two three-year periods, for all CSP categories, all indicating positive association 
between CSP and financial performance during the 2000-2003 period and negative 
association during the 1997-2000 period. There is strong evidence that companies with high 
CSP exhibit lower risk than companies with lower CSP in all CSP categories, though     12 
   
particularly in the governance category. This evidence is persistently strong for both total risk 
and market beta. 
6.  Discussion 
 
The results provide evidence of significant cross-sectional correlations between ranks of 
CSP and financial characteristics measures, which often depend on company size, trading 
history and industry classification. Portfolios with high, moderate and low CSP often exhibit 
significantly different financial characteristics, though there is no evidence of any inverted U-
shaped CSP-financial characteristics patterns as suggested by Bowman and Haire (1975) and 
Sturdivant and Ginter (1977). Results from the two parts of the analysis are largely consistent, 
though results are stronger in the first part. 
 
Among the CSP measures, more significant relationships are found between governance 
performance and financial characteristics, fewer significant relationships are found between 
social performance and financial characteristics, and very few significant relationships are 
found between environmental performance and financial characteristics. Strong and consistent 
evidence is found of a negative relationship between CSP and risk, which is strongest for 
governance performance, followed by social performance, and environmental performance. 
Governance performance is strongly and positively related to financial performance. This 
evidence is particularly strong and consistent among recently-listed companies and companies 
in the necessity services industry group. 
 
The evidence presented here provides important insights into the relationship between 
CSP and financial characteristics. Significant patterns are found in terms of investment style 
and in terms of financial performance and risk. The evidence suggests an overall positive 
association between size and governance performance, not dependent on industry. This could 
be interpreted as supporting the suggestion that larger firms are, to a greater extent than 
smaller firms, able to allocate resources towards pursuing CSP (Preston and O' Bannon 1997; 
Waddock and Graves 1997a). However, it makes better intuitive sense that this relationship is 
caused by a positive association between organisational complexity and governance 
performance. Hence, size itself is likely to be the important factor in determining governance 
performance, rather than the ability to spend on particular activities. The fact that this 
relationship appears to be independent of industry group classification also makes intuitive     13 
   
sense. While it is likely that particular industries are prone to particular controversies driving 
demand and supply of environmental and social performance, expectations of governance 
performance are perhaps less likely to be dependent on industry.  
 
Environmental and social performance is contingent on industry as well as size, 
although the association between size and social and environmental performance possibly 
exists for different reasons compared to governance performance. The link between size and 
environmental and social performance is also dependent on industry, indicating that large 
companies achieve higher environmental and social performance in some industries, but that 
small companies achieve higher performance in others. This is further supported by the fact 
that very large and very small companies tend to perform better on social and environmental 
criteria than moderately sized companies. When very large companies outperform moderately 
sized companies this may well be evidence of the ‘slack resources’ and ‘available funds’ 
hypotheses. When very small companies outperform moderately sized companies this is more 
likely to be explained by the fact that very small companies are likely to operate within 
particular niches which gives these companies a comparative advantage in achieving CSP. 
This appears to be the case within the commercial goods and services industries, where there 
is a negative relationship between size and environmental performance, and within the 
technology industries, where there is a negative relationship between size and social 
performance.  
 
This has implications for the investment style of SRI funds. If the constituency of SRI 
funds reflects CSP, which may or may not be the case, although there should be a very strong 
link, investment style will depend on the specific criteria on which the constituent firms are 
selected. Emphasis on governance issues will likely result in a portfolio dominated by large 
companies. Emphasis on environmental and social issues is however more likely to result in a 
portfolio of both very large companies, which possibly achieve high CSP because they can 
afford to, and very small companies that operate within particular niches. Furthermore, 
emphasis on environmental and social issues is likely to result in portfolios that are over-
exposed to certain industries and under-exposed to others. 
 
Some weak evidence is found of a negative relationship between governance 
performance and book-to-market value. This is consistent with evidence provided by Cochran 
and Wood (1984) and Pava and Krausz (1996), although they use a composite CSP measure     14 
   
rather than a specific measure of governance performance. This evidence supports the 
arguments provided by Ruf et al. (2001) that CSP is linked to valuable implicit contracts. 
Governance performance may be linked to valuable assets that are not accounted for on the 
balance sheet, hence this could link to valuable reputation, organisational capital or other 
intangibles. This in turn suggests that SRI portfolios selected based on governance 
performance may exhibit value rather than growth characteristics. Such portfolios are 
however not likely to exhibit particular value or growth characteristics if selected based on 
environmental or social performance. 
 
The present study provides evidence that governance performance is strongly and 
positively related to financial performance. This evidence is robust across full-sample 
analyses, and is concentrated among recently-listed companies, large companies and 
companies in the necessity services industry group. Similar but weaker evidence is found for 
social performance. This is interpreted as being particularly supportive of the idea that CSP, 
and specifically governance, is an indicator of quality of management (Waddock and Graves 
1997a), rather than the idea that governance is determined by financial performance or 
available resources.  The fact that governance is a long-term stable characteristic, whereas 
financial performance is erratic, gives further support to this position. This implies that the 
‘good management theory’ holds particularly strongly among recently listed companies, large 
companies and the group of companies that include banks, diversified financials, insurance 
and telecommunications companies, and among recently listed companies. 
 
Corporate governance may be particularly important to recently listed companies 
because they cannot depend on a track-record of good management and financial 
performance. Recently listed companies therefore need to convince their investors, suppliers 
and customers that they can be relied upon (or that the implicit contracts they hold with 
stakeholders are valuable), and must pursue the strategies available to them in order to lower 
the perceived risk of buying from, supplying to or investing in these companies. Governance 
may be particularly important to the success of large companies because they face higher 
expectations of governance.  Note that the relationship between governance performance and 
financial performance is also significant among large companies when financial performance 
is adjusted by size. Lastly, governance may be particularly important to banks, diversified 
financials, insurance and telecommunications companies because these companies produce 
high-credence services. In the case of banks, diversified financials and insurance companies a     15 
   
high level of regulation also discourages and departure from good governance standards. 
Stakeholders are likely to rely heavily on reputation and other factors that can lower perceived 
risk. High governance performance may therefore be important to gain competitive advantage 
within these markets. It is worth noting that the companies within this industry group are very 
large compared to the constituents of other industry groups. 
 
Further support for the idea that CSP is indicative of the quality of management is 
provided by the very strong and consistent evidence of a negative relationship between CSP 
and risk, which is also stronger in the governance category compared to the other categories. 
This evidence is robust across various samples, and is not contingent on size, trading history 
or industry. Note that this relationship is strong for all CSP measures, including 
environmental and social performance, although it is strongest for governance performance. 
 
This evidence is useful to managers, investors, SRI fund managers and regulators. To 
corporate managers, this evidence suggests that the pursuit of corporate governance and 
excellence in management may be justified as a strategy for furthering the objective of wealth 
maximisation. The pursuit of social performance may be similarly justified, but there is little 
evidence that the pursuit of environmental performance is generally positively related to 
financial performance (although there is a negative relationship between environmental 
performance and risk). Investors may consider CSP measures to contain useful information, 
and would in particular be justified in selecting companies with high governance and social 
performance, even for pure financial wealth-maximising reasons. To SRI fund managers, this 
provides good reason to continue to offer such products to investors, since they add value to 
investors financially (in addition to presumed non-wealth related utility).  
 
Ultimately, regulators may use this evidence as an indication that good governance is a 
market-driven virtue and that the need for intervention is limited. More specifically, 
governance is linked to quality of management, and quality of management is intuitively 
linked to financial performance. There is therefore a strong financial incentive for self-
regulation in terms of governance. This incentive is strongest among recently listed 
companies, who may rely on sending strong signals of high quality of management for lack of 
established reputation capital. This incentive is also particularly strong within the necessity 
services sector, possibly because of the high-credence nature of the services provided. The 
evidence provided here, paired with continued high governance performance within this     16 
   
industry group, should send credible signals to regulators of strong financial incentives to 
self-regulate. 
 
Social performance is not so clearly a market-driven virtue, and environmental 
performance even less so. The evidence provided here suggests that high environmental 
performance is not often associated with high financial performance. The only exception is 
perhaps the energy-related industry group, where there is some evidence of a significant 
positive relationship between environmental performance and financial performance. This 
could be due to the fact that these companies are large and being proactive on environmental 
issues is perceived as a requirement for maintaining a healthy relationship with stakeholders, 
and particularly regulators. This evidence suggests regulators should target industries where 
there is no financial incentive to self-regulate on environmental issues, as appears to be the 
case in the situational (lifestyle) consumption industry group, where costs of environmental 
performance appears to outweigh the benefits. 
 
In sum, relationships between governance performance and financial characteristics are 
much more easily detected than relationships between social and environmental performance 
and financial characteristics. These latter relationships appear to be rather elusive, and are not 
explained well by existing theories. They appear to be prone to contingencies, which are 
likely to be very specific to size and industry-type characteristics. 
 
The present study presents many interesting areas of future research. Firstly, findings 
suggest relationships between CSP and financial characteristics, and financial performance in 
particular, may differ across different time periods, which implies a need to expand the 
sample period of this type of research beyond the six-year period covered here. Secondly, the 
evidence presented here requires explanation. The question of how and why CSP-financial 
characteristics relationships exist has been explored to some extent from a theoretical 
perspective. It is perhaps time to search for evidence of why such relationships exist. Thirdly, 
the industry-specific analyses provided in the present study indicate that more specific similar 
approaches could yield clearer and more useful evidence of how industry-specific factors 
affect CSP-financial characteristics relationships. Lastly, the evidence provided here could 
also be used as a basis for more specific research on self-regulation within industries, and the 
extent to which negative environmental and social externalities of production are internalised 
and corrected by market forces.      17 
   
7.  Conclusion 
 
The present study makes a significant contribution to the existing literature by providing 
much needed Australian evidence and investigating a large sample of 237 companies covering 
a wide spectrum of different companies. The analysis employs publicly available CSP 
measures of environmental, social and corporate governance, sourced from an independent 
agency, and measures of financial characteristics consistent with contemporary conventions. 
The methodology employed also allows for important sources of heterogeneity in CSP-
financial characteristics relationships linked to size, trading history and industry. 
 
The study provides important evidence of CSP and financial characteristics among 
Australian firms. Among measures of environmental, social and governance performance, the 
strongest and clearest patterns between CSP and financial characteristics are found using 
governance performance measures, while more elusive patterns are found using 
environmental and social performance. Governance performance is strongly and positively 
associated with size, though only when considering a larger spectrum of firms. The 
association between social and environmental performance and size is non-linear, as very 
large and very small firms tend to perform better on environmental and social criteria than 
medium-sized firms. CSP-size relationships are otherwise sensitive to industry categorisation, 
as strong negative relationships are found on some industry groups while strong positive 
relationships are found in others.  
 
Strong evidence is presented for a positive association between governance 
performance and financial performance, followed by some evidence also of a positive 
association between social performance and financial performance. There is limited evidence 
of a consistent relationship between environmental performance and financial performance. 
The strongest and most consistent evidence of a CSP-financial characteristics relationship 
appears when comparing CSP and risk, where the association is strongly, consistently and 
significantly negative. This association is strongest in the governance category and is not 
overly sensitive to size, trading history or industry classification. 
 
This evidence is important to managers, investors, SRI fund managers and regulators. It 
is important to managers because it means they may justify the pursuit of governance 
performance by as good governance is associated with lower risk and higher financial     18 
   
performance, though care must be taken in insinuating causality without further evidence. On 
the other hand, it suggests managers in general should be wary of pursuing environmental 
performance (and to a lesser degree social performance) as part of a wealth-maximising 
corporate strategy, since the effectiveness of such a strategy is likely to be very specific to the 
type of company. The evidence is important to investors and SRI fund managers because it 
suggests socially responsible investors do not need to sacrifice financial return for CSP 
satisfaction. In fact, they are likely to gain financially on it if investment criteria include 
governance and, to some extent, social issues. Lastly, this evidence is important to regulators 
because the strong positive relationship between governance performance and financial 
performance suggests that governance performance may be a market-driven virtue, and that 
undue intervention may be unnecessary. On the other hand, social and particularly 
environmental performance is not always a profitable strategy, hence intervention may be 
necessary in certain markets.  
 
The present study contributes significantly by providing important Australian evidence 
of significant relationships between CSP and financial characteristics, and by demonstrating 
that CSP-financial characteristics research must adopt and further explore research methods 
that allows and searches for CSP-financial characteristics contingency factors. Such research 
is important because CSP and financial characteristics are related, and although the present 
study presents important findings there is much that can be done to further improve our 
understanding of why and how such relationships occur. 
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Notes 
 
1.  Please contact the corresponding author for further information. 
 
2.  Please contact the corresponding author for further information. 
 
3.  For example, the French rating agency AReSE provide CSP ratings on five criteria, 
including employee relations, shareholder relations, product quality, and community, 
environment (D’Arcimoles and Trebucq, 2000). Many commonly used U.S. CSP data 
sources include a higher number of CSP measures, such  as the KLD  ratings  which 
covers seven categories (Waddock and Graves, 2000) and the Fortune ratings which 
covers eight categories (Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998). Many of these rating agencies 
provide ratings on issues that are more management-performance related than CSR-
related, in addition to certain common CSR issues. 
 
4.  Sample periods longer than six years were deemed impractical due to limited data 
availability, and sample periods shorter than three years are also impractical as it is 
difficult to estimate Jensen alphas and market betas over short periods. Note that Jensen 
alphas and market betas cannot effectively be measured for individual firms due to 
estimation problems. These measures are instead estimated based for portfolios of firms 
which are formed on the basis of CSP. 
 
5.  The use of ranked data means some information is lost (in terms of density of CSP 
ratings), however the advantage of using ranked data is that non-normal distributions 
will not affect the reliability of results and that all companies may be included in the 
analysis, also companies with extreme financial characteristics values. 
 
6.   Pilot studies were conducted using both approaches. The methodology of Herremans, 
Akathaporn and McInnes (1993) proved inappropriate due to significant heterogeneity 
in CSP ratings within industries. This causes problems as their method is based in 
industry averages of CSP and financial characteristics data. The results of the pilot 
study did not yield meaningful results.     20 
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·  Low-frequency, high-involvement, high  
   financial cost purchases 
·  High level of consumer choice and information 
·  High financial, functional, social and psychological 
risk 
·  Emotional decision making 
·  Issues of sustainable use of land 
·  Supplies only to industry 
·  Rational decision making 
Materials (38) 
·  Issues of pollution and sustainable energy 
sources 
·  End consumers have limited choice 
·  Rational decision making 
·  No obvious CSR issues 
·  Rational decision making 
·  Possible ethical issues 
·  High credence 
·  Rational decision making 
·  High-frequency, low-involvement purchase 
·  High level of consumer choice and information 
·  Issues of sustainable consumption (recycling) 
·  Low perceived risk 
·  Rational decision making 
·  Supply to industrials 
·  Low consumer 
influence 
·  Low level of 
stakeholder activism 
·  Subject to 
environmental 
controversy 
·  Consumers may 





·  Consists of industries 
where consumers make 
purchase decisions 




·  Consumers are directly 
affected by these 
industries 
·  Consumers are able to 
intervene directly by 
switching suppliers 
·  Decisions are not always 
strictly rational 
Energy related industries (31) 
Commercial goods & services (47) 
Technology goods & services (39) 
Situational consumption (20) 
Materials 
Habit consumption (31) 
·  Limited information  
·  Low-frequency, high-involvement purchase 
·  Perceived high switching costs 
·  High credence and high financial risk 
·  Rational decision making  
·  Some controversy on customer service and fair pricing issues 





Comm. Services  
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Table 1:  Spearman Rank Correlations Between CSP and Financial Characteristics 
 
This table presents Spearman Rank correlations between CSP, including environmental, social and 
governance  performance,  and  financial  characteristics  measures,  including  size,  book-to-market 
value, total shareholder return, Sharpe Ratio, benchmark-adjusted performance, total risk, Jensen 
alpha, and market beta. Correlations are calculated based on the full sample of 237 companies, the 
largest  100  companies  in  the  sample  (large  companies),  the  smaller  137  companies  (small 
companies), the 156 companies with full-period coverage in trading data (full-period sample), the 
81 companies with limited coverage (recently listed companies), and seven industry groups. Alphas 
and betas are only compared to CSP for the full sample. Statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 
percent level is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel 1: Correlations between CSP and size 
Sample      Period  Env. Perf.  Social Perf.  Gov. Perf 
1997-2003  0.03  0.09  0.14** 
2000-2003  0.02  0.08  0.15**  Full sample 
1997-2000  0.10  0.23***  0.21*** 
1997-2003  0.25**  0.30***  -0.11 
2000-2003  0.24**  0.30***  -0.10  Large companies 
1997-2000  0.31***  0.32***  -0.18 
1997-2003  -0.18**  -0.19**  -0.09 
2000-2003  -0.16*  -0.15*  -0.06  Small companies 
1997-2000  -0.21**  -0.08  -0.08 
1997-2003  0.13*  0.29***  0.07 
2000-2003  0.13  0.28***  0.06  Full-period sample 
1997-2000  0.14*  0.29***  0.07 
1997-2003  0.00  -0.12  -0.21* 
2000-2003  -0.03  -0.13  -0.16 
Recently listed 
companies 
1997-2000  0.56**  0.36  -0.41* 
1997-2003  -0.31**  0.04  0 
2000-2003  -0.30**  0.04  -0.02 
Commercial goods & 
services 
1997-2000  -0.35**  0.1  0.07 
1997-2003  0.08  0.27  0.2 
2000-2003  0.14  0.23  0.16 
Energy related 
industries 
1997-2000  0.2  0.64***  0.39* 
1997-2003  0.34*  0.21  0.16 
2000-2003  0.34*  0.21  0.22 
Habit consumption 
industries 
1997-2000  0.46***  0.22  0.14 
1997-2003  -0.37  -0.2  -0.22 
2000-2003  -0.41*  -0.23  -0.28 
Situational (lifestyle) 
consumption industries 
1997-2000  -0.18  -0.27  -0.19 
1997-2003  -0.13  0.43***  0.44*** 
2000-2003  -0.18  0.41**  0.47***  Materials 
1997-2000  -0.13  0.43**  0.43** 
1997-2003  0.42**  0.35*  0.09 
2000-2003  0.40**  0.39**  0.14  Necessity services 
1997-2000  0.48**  0.31  -0.07 
1997-2003  0.46***  -0.66***  -0.16 
2000-2003  0.44***  -0.68***  -0.14  Technology industries 
1997-2000  0.48**  -0.39*  0.15 
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Panel 2: Correlations between CSP and book-to-market value 
Sample      Period  Env. Perf.  Social Perf.  Gov. Perf 
1997-2003  -0.03  -0.05  -0.04 
2000-2003  -0.02  -0.06  -0.09  Full sample 
1997-2000  -0.03  -0.06  0.09 
1997-2003  -0.21**  -0.11  -0.06 
2000-2003  -0.17*  -0.08  -0.14  Large companies 
1997-2000  -0.17  -0.15  0.15 
1997-2003  0.03  0.03  -0.10 
2000-2003  0.00  -0.06  -0.14*  Small companies 
1997-2000  0.03  0.08  -0.01 
1997-2003  -0.03  -0.10  -0.08 
2000-2003  -0.08  -0.15*  -0.14*  Full-period sample 
1997-2000  0.03  0.00  0.02 
1997-2003  -0.06  0.09  -0.07 
2000-2003  0.00  0.08  -0.16 
Recently listed 
companies 
1997-2000  -0.47**  -0.11  0.20 
1997-2004  0.01  -0.12  0.03 
2000-2004  0.02  -0.14  -0.02 
Commercial goods & 
services 
1997-2001  -0.02  -0.15  0.07 
1997-2005  -0.28  -0.08  0.02 
2000-2005  -0.26  -0.08  -0.06 
Energy related 
industries 
1997-2002  -0.38*  -0.18  -0.04 
1997-2006  -0.28  -0.23  -0.38** 
2000-2006  -0.23  -0.19  -0.28** 
Habit consumption 
industries 
1997-2003  -0.22  -0.28  -0.47** 
1997-2007  0.43*  0.02  0.2 
2000-2007  0.37  0.05  0.16 
Situational (lifestyle) 
consumption industries 
1997-2004  0.78***  -0.28  0.47* 
1997-2008  0.08  0.27*  -0.1 
2000-2008  0.14  0.25  -0.22  Materials 
1997-2005  -0.05  0.12  0.27 
1997-2009  -0.44**  -0.3  -0.09 
2000-2009  -0.38**  -0.35*  -0.19  Necessity services 
1997-2006  -0.13  0.15  0.49** 
1997-2010  0.07  0.04  -0.14 
2000-2010  0.09  0.03  -0.18  Technology industries 
1997-2007  0.27  -0.1  -0.23 
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Panel 3: Correlations between CSP and total shareholder return 











RI RI where RI, P, and D 
represent  total  shareholder  return  index  value,  share  price  and  dividend  distribution, 
respectively, and t and t-1 represents current day and previous trading day, respectively. Total 
shareholder return is calculated as the percentage change in the return index value from one 
month to the next. Data for measuring total was collected from Datastream. 
 
Sample      Period  Env. Perf.  Social Perf.  Gov. Perf 
1997-2003  0.01  0.08  0.08 
2000-2003  0.00  0.11*  0.25***  Full sample 
1997-2000  0.01  -0.04  -0.13* 
1997-2003  -0.02  -0.05  0.09 
2000-2003  -0.08  0.02  0.25**  Large companies 
1997-2000  0.03  -0.13  -0.22** 
1997-2003  0.00  0.02  0.02 
2000-2003  0.06  0.09  0.14  Small companies 
1997-2000  -0.06  -0.05  -0.10 
1997-2003  0.04  -0.07  -0.10 
2000-2003  0.05  0.05  0.12  Full-period sample 
1997-2000  0.01  -0.12  -0.21** 
1997-2003  -0.08  0.16  0.27** 
2000-2003  -0.07  0.23**  0.35*** 
Recently listed 
companies 
1997-2000  0.01  -0.05  0.13 
1997-2004  0.11  0.02  0.05 
2000-2004  0.02  0.04  0.18 
Commercial goods & 
services 
1997-2001  0.06  0.01  -0.04 
1997-2005  0.31*  0.04  0 
2000-2005  0.07  -0.04  0.05 
Energy related 
industries 
1997-2002  0.45**  0.06  -0.18 
1997-2006  -0.01  0.05  0.07 
2000-2006  0.06  0.15  0.04 
Habit consumption 
industries 
1997-2003  -0.09  0.03  0.11 
1997-2007  -0.48**  -0.27  0.06 
2000-2007  -0.22  -0.41*  0.24 
Situational (lifestyle) 
consumption industries 
1997-2004  -0.43  0.07  -0.46* 
1997-2008  -0.06  0.02  0.19 
2000-2008  0  0.06  0.31*  Materials 
1997-2005  -0.2  -0.03  -0.08 
1997-2009  0.40**  0.40**  0.43** 
2000-2009  0.15  0.50***  0.48***  Necessity services 
1997-2006  0.18  -0.3  -0.21 
1997-2010  -0.13  0.13  0.03 
2000-2010  -0.33**  0.30*  0.29*  Technology industries 
1997-2007  0.2  -0.19  -0.41* 
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Panel 4: Correlations between CSP and Sharpe Ratio 





= where  ER  is  the 
average  excess  return  on  an  asset,  and  is  calculated  using  a  10-year 
Australian government as the risk-free rate of return, sER is the standard 
deviation of excess returns, calculated based on monthly excess returns. 
 
Sample      Period  Env. Perf.  Social Perf.  Gov. Perf 
1997-2003  -0.09  -0.01  0.09 
2000-2003  -0.03  0.10  0.27***  Full sample 
1997-2000  0.08  0.01  -0.10 
1997-2003  -0.02  -0.01  0.06 
2000-2003  -0.05  0.06  0.29***  Large companies 
1997-2000  0.02  -0.09  -0.27** 
1997-2003  0.07  0.10  0.15* 
2000-2003  0.02  0.07  0.21**  Small companies 
1997-2000  0.07  0.06  -0.17 
1997-2003  0.08  0.10  0.09 
2000-2003  0.04  0.04  0.20**  Full-period sample 
1997-2000  0.10  0.11  -0.01 
1997-2003  -0.02  0.09  0.34*** 
2000-2003  -0.09  0.15  0.37*** 
Recently listed 
companies 
1997-2000  0.10  -0.17  0.01 
1997-2004  0.09  -0.02  0.02 
2000-2004  -0.04  0  0.17 
Commercial goods & 
services 
1997-2001  0.1  0.04  -0.06 
1997-2005  0.38**  0.06  0.11 
2000-2005  0.18  0.03  0.19 
Energy related 
industries 
1997-2002  0.43**  0.08  -0.17 
1997-2006  0  0.12  0.09 
2000-2006  0.09  0.19  0.06 
Habit consumption 
industries 
1997-2003  -0.03  0.04  -0.01 
1997-2007  -0.51**  -0.3  0.15 
2000-2007  -0.32  -0.43*  0.27 
Situational (lifestyle) 
consumption industries 
1997-2004  -0.46*  0.14  -0.38 
1997-2008  -0.08  0.09  0.27* 
2000-2008  -0.06  0.02  0.33**  Materials 
1997-2005  -0.13  0.02  -0.11 
1997-2009  0.29  0.52***  0.43** 
2000-2009  0.05  0.48***  0.55***  Necessity services 
1997-2006  0.2  0.04  -0.03 
1997-2010  -0.03  0.1  0.17 
2000-2010  -0.26  0.26  0.21  Technology industries 
1997-2007  0.36*  -0.25  -0.08 
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Panel 5: Correlations between CSP and Benchmark-adjusted performance 
 
The benchmark-adjusted performance measure is based on the characteristics-matched 
benchmark  portfolios  developed  by  Daniel,  Grinblatt,  Titman  and  Wermers  (1997). 
Benchmark-adjusted performance is the return on an asset, less the return on a portfolio 
of assets with similar characteristics as the objective asset. Portfolios are constructed on a 
quarterly basis as follows. First, only companies with complete size, value or returns data 
are included. Second, the included companies are ranked by size and sorted into five 
portfolios of approximately the same number, all with similar size. Third, each of these 
portfolios are ranked by book-to-market value and sorted into five portfolios producings 
25 portfolios of similar size and value characteristics, with an average of 18.8 companies. 
Benchmark-adjusted performance is adjusted for outlier returns which would otherwise 
give bias to the measures. 
 
Sample      Period  Env. Perf.  Social Perf.  Gov. Perf 
1997-2003  0.03  0.15**  0.09 
2000-2003  0.04  0.11*  0.21***  Full sample 
1997-2000  0.02  0.07  -0.04 
1997-2003  -0.05  0.07  0.20** 
2000-2003  -0.11  0.00  0.24**  Large companies 
1997-2000  -0.03  -0.02  -0.07 
1997-2003  0.08  0.09  0.01 
2000-2003  0.13  0.14  0.10  Small companies 
1997-2000  0.01  -0.04  -0.09 
1997-2003  0.07  -0.02  -0.04 
2000-2003  0.09  0.03  0.09  Full-period sample 
1997-2000  0.02  -0.06  -0.14* 
1997-2003  -0.04  0.27**  0.23** 
2000-2003  -0.06  0.26**  0.31*** 
Recently listed 
companies 
1997-2000  -0.08  0.05  0.15 
1997-2004  0.18  0.07  0.08 
2000-2004  0.07  0.03  0.15 
Commercial goods & 
services 
1997-2001  0.04  0  0.08 
1997-2005  0.1  0.11  -0.12 
2000-2005  -0.01  -0.02  0.02 
Energy related 
industries 
1997-2002  0.3  0.16  -0.05 
1997-2006  0.06  0.18  0.06 
2000-2006  0.14  0.11  -0.05 
Habit consumption 
industries 
1997-2003  -0.06  0.12  0.12 
1997-2007  -0.15  -0.27  0.05 
2000-2007  -0.17  -0.29  0.24 
Situational (lifestyle) 
consumption industries 
1997-2004  -0.16  -0.2  -0.34 
1997-2008  -0.05  0.07  0.2 
2000-2008  0.28*  0.1  0.35**  Materials 
1997-2005  -0.25  -0.07  0.04 
1997-2009  0.23  0.38**  0.50*** 
2000-2009  0.08  0.37**  0.52***  Necessity services 
1997-2006  0.37*  0.05  0.18 
1997-2010  -0.07  0.17  0.05 
2000-2010  -0.38**  0.31*  0.21  Technology industries 
1997-2007  0.26  -0.05  -0.43* 
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Panel 6: Correlations between CSP and Total risk 
 
Total risk is measured as the standard deviation of monthly return. Data for measuring 
total risk was collected from Datastream. 
 
Sample      Period  Env. Perf.  Social Perf.  Gov. Perf 
1997-2003  -0.14**  -0.16**  -0.37*** 
2000-2003  -0.12*  -0.13**  -0.33***  Full sample 
1997-2000  -0.19**  -0.21***  -0.34*** 
1997-2003  -0.15  -0.17*  -0.26*** 
2000-2003  -0.10  -0.17*  -0.25**  Large companies 
1997-2000  -0.23*  -0.17  -0.1314 
1997-2003  -0.14  -0.08  -0.31*** 
2000-2003  -0.12  -0.07  -0.23***  Small companies 
1997-2000  -0.09  -0.09  -0.24** 
1997-2003  -0.09  -0.25***  -0.35*** 
2000-2003  -0.07  -0.22***  -0.27***  Full-period sample 
1997-2000  -0.07  -0.21***  -0.33*** 
1997-2003  -0.13  0.02  -0.28** 
2000-2003  -0.11  0.03  -0.28** 
Recently listed 
companies 
1997-2000  -0.27  -0.04  0.03 
1997-2004  -0.02  -0.03  -0.21 
2000-2004  -0.07  0.00  -0.06 
Commercial goods & 
services 
1997-2001  0.10  -0.05  -0.32* 
1997-2005  -0.20  -0.11  -0.44** 
2000-2005  -0.23  -0.16  -0.54*** 
Energy related 
industries 
1997-2002  -0.15  -0.21  -0.22 
1997-2006  -0.15  -0.37**  -0.28 
2000-2006  -0.18  -0.33*  -0.27 
Habit consumption 
industries 
1997-2003  -0.21  -0.36*  -0.24 
1997-2007  0.00  0.28  -0.59*** 
2000-2007  0.07  0.33  -0.55** 
Situational (lifestyle) 
consumption industries 
1997-2004  -0.05  -0.13  -0.42 
1997-2008  -0.03  -0.28*  -0.36** 
2000-2008  0.09  -0.23  -0.31*  Materials 
1997-2005  -0.22  -0.19  -0.21 
1997-2009  -0.02  -0.52***  -0.41** 
2000-2009  -0.09  -0.57***  -0.42**  Necessity services 
1997-2006  0.04  -0.53**  -0.32 
1997-2010  -0.10  0.15  -0.41** 
2000-2010  -0.23  0.21  -0.21  Technology industries 
1997-2007  -0.10  -0.04  -0.72*** 
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Panel 7: Correlations between CSP and Jensen alpha 
 
The equation  
( ) ( ) ( ) t ft M Mt ft S St Lt V Gt Vt t R R R R R R R R e a b b b - = + - + - + - + is  used  to 
estimate a three-factor Jensen alpha. R t is the company total return for month t; R f t is the 
risk-free rate of return for month t, measured by the 10-year Australian government bond; 
R M t is the market return for month t, measured by the ASX All Ordinaries Index; R S t is 
the return on small companies for month t, measured by the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries 
Index; R L t is the return on large companies for month t, measured by the S&P/ASX 200 
Index;  R G t  is  the  return  on  growth  companies  for  month  t,  measured  by  the  MSCI 
Growth Index; and R Vt is the return on value companies for month t, measured by the 
MSCI Value Index. Of the estimated parameters, a is the three-factor Jensen alpha, the 
factor b ‘s measure exposure to the respective risk factors, and e t is a residual error term.  
 
Sample      Period  Env. Perf.  Social Perf.  Gov. Perf 
2000-2003  0.04  0.43**  0.46** 
Full Sample 
1997-2000  -0.06  -0.20  -0.28 
 
 
Panel 8: Correlations between CSP and market beta 
 
The  equation  ( ) t ft M Mt ft t R R R R e a b - = + - + is  used  to  estimate  a  single-factor 
market beta. R t is the company total return for month t; R f t is the risk-free rate of return 
for month t, measured by the 10-year Australian government bond; and R M t is the market 
return  for  month  t,  measured  by  the  ASX  All  Ordinaries  Index.  Of  the  estimated 
parameters,  a  is  a  single-factor  Jensen  alpha,  bM  is  the  single-factor  market  beta, 
measuring exposure to the market factor, and e t is a residual error term.  
 
Sample      Period  Env. Perf.  Social Perf.  Gov. Perf 
2000-2003  -0.29  -0.11  -0.48** 
Full Sample 
1997-2000  -0.27  -0.49**  -0.50** 
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Table 2:  Comparing Financial Characteristics of High, Moderate and Low CSP Companies 
 
This table reports average financial characteristics measures of high (H), moderate (M) and low (L) CSP 
company portfolios. Comparisons are made based on portfolios formed from the full sample with the four 
companies  with  the  largest  monthly  return  outliers  omitted,  hence  the  sample  base  consists  of  233 
companies. Portfolios are formed by first ranking companies by CSP ratings, then dividing the sample into 
three portfolios of approximately equal size (by  number  of companies). The procedure is repeated for 
environmental, social and governance performance ratings. Financial characteristics measures include size 
(measured by average monthly total market capitalisation), book-to-market value (measured by average 
monthly book-to-market value), total shareholder return (measured as annualised average monthly return), 
Sharpe Ratio (measured as average monthly total excess return divided by total risk), benchmark-adjusted 
performance  (measured  as  annualised  average  monthly  abnormal  return),  Jensen  alpha  (adjusted  for 
systematic  market,  size  and  value  risk  factors,  estimated  using  monthly  portfolio  returns),  total  risk 
(measured as standard deviation of monthly return), and market beta (measured in a single-factor model, 
estimated using monthly portfolio returns). Differences between high and low (H-L), high and moderate 
(H-M) and moderate and low (M-L) environmental performance portfolios are reported in the last three 
columns. Results for portfolios constructed based on environmental, social and governance performance are 
presented in panels 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level is 
indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel 1: Environmental performance 
    Average portfolio values  Portfolio differences 
FC measure     Period  H  M  L  H-L  H-M  M-L 
1997-2003  8.6899  8.6972  8.5646  0.1253  -0.0073  0.1326 
2000-2003  8.7081  8.7280  8.5993  0.1088  -0.0198  0.1286  Size 
 
1997-2000  8.7551  8.7091  8.4723  0.2827  0.0460  0.2368* 
1997-2003  0.6286  0.7371  0.6946  -0.0660  -0.1085  0.0425 
2000-2003  0.6552  0.7713  0.7343  -0.0791  -0.1161  0.0370  Book-to-market 
value 
1997-2000  0.5527  0.5732  0.6264  -0.0737  -0.0205  -0.0532 
1997-2003  0.0950  0.1256  0.0925  0.0025  -0.0307  0.0331 
2000-2003  0.0685  0.0104  0.0211  0.0475  0.0582  -0.0107 
Total 
shareholder 
return   1997-2000  0.1416  0.3287  0.2265  -0.0850  -0.1872***  0.1022 
1997-2003  0.0521  0.0590  0.0241  0.0280  -0.0069  0.0349 
2000-2003  0.0563  0.0222  0.0445  0.0118  0.0341  -0.0223  Sharpe Ratio 
1997-2000  0.0477  0.1212  0.0190  0.0287  -0.0735*  0.1022*** 
1997-2003  0.1029  0.0917  0.0616  0.0414  0.0113  0.0301 
2000-2003  0.0111  -0.0751  -0.0638  0.0749  0.0862  -0.0114 
Benchmark-
adjusted 
performance  1997-2000  0.2560  0.4079  0.2828  -0.0268  -0.1519**  0.1251 
2000-2003  0.0053  0.0020  0.0000  0.0053***  0.0033***  0.0020*  Jensen alpha 
1997-2000  0.0068  0.0281  0.0133  -0.0064***  -0.0213***  0.0148*** 
1997-2003  0.1142  0.1387  0.1472  -0.0329***  -0.0245**  -0.0085 
2000-2003  0.1101  0.1267  0.1350  -0.0249**  -0.0166  -0.0083   
Total risk 
1997-2000  0.1114  0.1329  0.1483  -0.0369**  -0.0215  -0.0154 
2000-2003  0.8724  1.3726  1.3321  -0.4596***  -0.5002***  0.0406  Market beta 
1997-2000  0.8605  1.1674  1.0477  -0.1872***  -0.3068***  0.1196*** 
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Panel 2: Social performance 
    Average portfolio values  Portfolio differences 
FC measure     Period  H  M  L  H-L  H-M  M-L 
1997-2003  8.8233  8.5560  8.5704  0.2529**  0.2673*  -0.0144 
2000-2003  8.8537  8.5741  8.6064  0.2473*  0.2796*  -0.0323  Size 
 
1997-2000  9.0190  8.4811  8.4321  0.5868***  0.5379***  0.0490 
1997-2003  0.6241  0.7463  0.6930  -0.0690  -0.1223  0.0533 
2000-2003  0.6030  0.7763  0.7808  -0.1778*  -0.1733  -0.0045  Book-to-
market value 
1997-2000  0.5671  0.5843  0.6050  -0.0379  -0.0172  -0.0207 
1997-2003  0.1127  0.0947  0.1053  0.0075  0.0181  -0.0106 
2000-2003  0.0907  -0.0009  0.0094  0.0813  0.0916*  -0.0102 
Total 
shareholder 
return   1997-2000  0.1671  0.2398  0.2809  -0.1138  -0.0728  -0.0411 
1997-2003  0.0488  0.0495  0.0353  0.0135  -0.0007  0.0143 
2000-2003  0.0682  0.0197  0.0352  0.0330  0.0485  -0.0156  Sharpe Ratio 
1997-2000  0.0482  0.0823  0.0509  -0.0027  -0.0342  0.0315 
1997-2003  0.1152  0.0809  0.0592  0.0560  0.0342  0.0218 
2000-2003  0.0114  -0.0702  -0.0715  0.0829  0.0817*  0.0012 
Benchmark-
adjusted 
performance  1997-2000  0.2898  0.3301  0.3190  -0.0292  -0.0403  0.0111 
2000-2003  0.0075  0.0004  -0.0016  0.0091***  0.0071***  0.0020*  Jensen alpha 
1997-2000  0.0103  0.0159  0.0204  -0.0101***  -0.0056***  -0.0045*** 
1997-2003  0.1232  0.1232  0.1544  -0.0311**  0.0000  -0.0312** 
2000-2003  0.1140  0.1159  0.1422  -0.0282**  -0.0019  -0.0263**   
Total risk 
1997-2000  0.1138  0.1266  0.1524  -0.0386**  -0.0128  -0.0258 
2000-2003  1.1243  1.1477  1.3258  -0.2014***  -0.0234  -0.1781***  Market beta 
1997-2000  0.7424  1.0459  1.2680  -0.5256***  -0.3035***  -0.2221*** 
 
Panel 3: Governance performance 
    Average portfolio values  Portfolio differences 
FC measure  Period  H  M  L  H-L  H-M  M-L 
1997-2003  8.9035  8.4955  8.5676  0.3359**  0.4080***  -0.0721 
2000-2003  8.9327  8.5286  8.5900  0.3427**  0.4041***  -0.0614 
Size 
 
1997-2000  8.9503  8.4942  8.4448  0.5055***  0.4560***  0.0495 
1997-2003  0.6385  0.6627  0.7629  -0.1243  -0.0242  -0.1002 
2000-2003  0.6329  0.6469  0.8877  -0.2547***  -0.0140  -0.2407** 
Book-to-
market value 
1997-2000  0.6557  0.5287  0.5726  0.0830  0.1270  -0.0440 
1997-2003  0.1252  0.1044  0.0842  0.0410  0.0208  0.0202 




1997-2000  0.1509  0.2558  0.2949  -0.1439*  -0.1049*  -0.0390 
1997-2003  0.0705  0.0506  0.0126  0.0579**  0.0200  0.0379* 
2000-2003  0.1010  0.0362  -0.0114  0.1123***  0.0648**  0.0475  Sharpe Ratio 
1997-2000  0.0304  0.0876  0.0635  -0.0331  -0.0572  0.0241 
1997-2003  0.1195  0.0827  0.0527  0.0668  0.0368  0.0300 




1997-2000  0.2808  0.3199  0.3439  -0.0631  -0.0392  -0.0239 
2000-2003  0.0083  -0.0002  -0.0016  0.0098***  0.0085***  0.0013  Jensen alpha 
1997-2000  0.0077  0.0175  0.0226  -0.0149***  -0.0098***  -0.0051*** 
1997-2003  0.1044  0.1329  0.1638  -0.0594***  -0.0285**  -0.0309** 
2000-2003  0.0968  0.1285  0.1467  -0.0499***  -0.0317***  -0.0182 
 
Total risk 
1997-2000  0.1082  0.1234  0.1679  -0.0597***  -0.0152  -0.0445** 
2000-2003  0.9524  1.1021  1.5496  -0.5971***  -0.1497***  -0.4474***  Market beta 
1997-2000  0.7993  0.9473  1.3607  -0.5613***  -0.1480***  -0.4134*** 
 